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Abstract: Increasing ethnic diversity fosters scholarly interest in how the spatial segregation of groups aects
opinion polarization in a society. Despite much empirical and theoretical research, there is little consensus in
the literature on the causal link between the spatial segregation of two groups and the emergence of opinion
polarization. We contribute to the debate by investigating theoretically the conditions under which the former
fosters or hinders the latter. We focus on two processes of opinion polarization (negative influence and persua-
sive argument communication) that, according topreviousmodelingwork, canbeexpected tomake conflicting
predictions about the relationship between segregation and opinion polarization. With a Schelling-type agent-
based model of residential segregation, we generate initial environments with dierent levels of group segre-
gation. Then we simulate the two processes of opinion dynamics. We show that the negative influence model
predicts segregation to hinder the emergence of opinion polarization. On the other hand, the persuasive argu-
mentmodel predicts that segregation does not substantially foster polarization. Moreover, we explore how the
spatial patterns of opinion distribution dier between the models: in particular, we investigate the likelihood
that group membership and opinion align. We show that the alignment of group membership and opinions
diers between the two opinion formation models, and that the scale at which we measure alignment plays a
crucial role.
Keywords: Opinion Dynamics, Polarization, Social Influence, Segregation
Introduction
1.1 Due to mass migration, many societies have witnessed a strong increase in ethnic and cultural diversity in re-
cent decades. Rising levels of ethnic diversity are accompanied by ethnic segregation between andwithin cities
and between and within neighborhoods (Phillips 2007). Furthermore, in many western countries, ethnic res-
idential segregation has developed alongside with a rise of anti-immigrant attitudes and support for radical
right-wing parties. This has renewed public and scholarly interest in the societal consequences of diversity.
Pundits identify ethnic residential segregation as one potential source of polarization between ethnic groups
in terms of opinions about salient societal issues, such as cultural values and those regarding immigration and
integration policies (Semyonov & Glikman 2008). Scholars inquire if and how ethnic segregation may actually
be causally related to the emergence of extreme attitudes towards ethnicminorities (Edwards 2016; Semyonov
&Glikman2008; Valdez 2014; vanderWaal et al. 2013). Segregation in other societal realmshas also been linked
to polarization. For example, scholars suggested that spatial seating arrangements and segregated networks of
party ailiations in the U.S. senate relates to patterns of polarization in the voting behavior of parliamentarians
(Liu & Srivastava 2015). Yet, despitemany empirical studies of the relationship between spatial segregation and
opinion polarization, there is no consensus in the literature on whether segregation is a suicient condition for
opinion polarization to arise and on the causal mechanisms linking these two phenomena.
1.2 Weaddress the segregationpolarization relationship theoretically by framing thepuzzle in a formal fashion and
adopting a generative approach (Epstein 2006). We study how, when andwhere spatial segregation based on a
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static demographic characteristic leads to the emergence of opinion polarization. We test dierent causal path-
ways by explicating alternative micro-level mechanisms (i.e. how) under dierent initial segregation patterns
(i.e. when) and by assessing the extent of opinion polarization between and within demographic groups both
at the global and local level (i.e. where).
Literature Overview
2.1 Following the line of previous conceptualizations of polarization (DiMaggio et al. 1996; Esteban & Ray 1994),
we define opinion polarization as a process in which a population gradually falls apart into subgroups in an
opinion spacewith increasing disagreement between the opinion subgroups, and increasing agreementwithin
them. Whenopinions are only polarizedbetween thedierent demographic groupsbut notwithin each specific
demographic group, we speak of strong alignment between opinions and demographic groups. Spatial segre-
gation implies dierent group compositions in dierent (sub)localities, subsequently patterns of polarization
may dier between local regions but also between groups at the global level.
2.2 The challenge of modelling opinion polarization as an emergent phenomenon within an agent-based compu-
tational modelling framework has attracted increasing attention from scholars in recent years. Some (Alizadeh
et al. 2014; Huet et al. 2008) develop agent-based models of opinion polarization building on classic bounded
confidence models (Deuant et al. 2002; Hegselmann & Krause 2002). Others propose models that generate
opinion polarization as result of agents’ biased-assimilation to social influences (Dandekar et al. 2013). Two
further prominent classes of models in the literature on opinion polarization are the models of negative in-
fluence (Flache & Macy 2011b; Macy et al. 2003) and of social influence based on persuasive arguments (Mäs &
Flache 2013; Mäs et al. 2013) both ofwhich root in classic sociological and psychological theories of polarization
processes (Myers 1982).
2.3 We will align and compare these two types of models in a model-to-model analysis (Axtell et al. 1996; Hales
et al. 2003). These classes ofmodels share two features thatmake themhighly suitable for the aimof our inves-
tigation. First, in order to generate opinion polarization, strong initial opinion disagreement between agents
from dierent groups is not a necessary condition. This feature is crucial because it allows understanding how
polarization may arise fromminimal conditions, even when there is no prior disagreement separating groups.
Secondly, models drawing on negative influence and persuasive argument processes allow linking the change
of agents’ opinions to both (dynamic) opinions and (static) demographic characteristics of interacting agents.
A static attribute (e.g. ethnicity) allows to incorporate spatial group segregation as an exogenously imposed
social condition in a model of opinion dynamics in which exposure to outgroup members will decrease with
increasing segregation between groups.
2.4 Previous research suggests that these twoclassesofmodels support opposite intuitionsabout the role that spa-
tial segregation plays for opinion polarizationwith fundamentally dierent substantive implications. Models of
negative influence point to the intuition that polarization between groups may best be avoided by preventing
the exposure of individuals to a negatively evaluated outgroup. Conversely, models of persuasive arguments
suggest that exposure to the outgroupmay be crucial in preventing polarization (Flache&Mäs 2008b;Mäs et al.
2013). To theextent that spatial proximity is adeterminantof chancesof interactionbetweenpeople (Backstrom
et al. 2010; Balland 2012; Hipp & Perrin 2009), this leaves uswith opposite implications for the relation between
spatial group segregation andpolarization. However, previousmodellingwork also is far fromconclusive about
this. In earlier studies, segregation was at best manipulated indirectly, with highly stylized patterns of segrega-
tion in the distribution of fixed attributes in small-scale interaction networks. Our study puts at test whether
and to what extent the conflicting predictions of the models of negative influence and persuasive arguments
remain robust when much larger (N = 6400) and more realistic network topologies are taken into account.
We impose dierent initial residential segregation patterns, which vary in cluster size and cluster homogeneity,
and we investigate how group segregation aects the emergence of opinion patterns between and within de-
mographic groups at both the global level (i.e. the entire network or ‘country’) and at the local level (i.e. within
specific subparts of our network or ‘neighborhoods’).
2.5 Thus our research provides new insights into the conditions under which dierent levels of segregation may
foster (or prevent) polarization and into the patterns through which the two competing sets of assumptions
predict polarization to emerge.
2.6 Formal models incorporating the negative influence mechanism build on classical computational models of
social influence (Abelson 1964; French Jr. 1956; Harary 1959). The latter only assume positive social influence
âĂŞ that is, interacting individuals tend to reduce their opinion dierences. In linewith the homophily principle
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(McPherson et al. 2001), more recent extensions (Axelrod 1997) assume that interactions betweenmore similar
individuals aremore likely tooccurormore strongly aect opinions than interactionsbetween less similar ones.
Models of negative influence add that individuals are not only homophilic, but xenophobic, too. This can be de-
rived from cognitive theories (Festinger 1957; Heider 1946), which assume that individuals strive for balanced
cognitions. They tend to like similar people and dislike dissimilar ones. In models building on negative influ-
ence, being exposed to dissimilar others evokes negative influence, defined as the tendency of individuals to
adjust their opinions in a way to increase opinion dierences to negatively evaluated others (Macy et al. 2003).
The negative influence is assumed to be stronger when attitudinal and demographic dissimilarity is stronger or
more salient. For negative influence models, negative influence of dissimilar others in combination with posi-
tive influence of similar others is the key mechanism for explaining the emergence of opinion polarization in a
population (Baldassarri & Bearman 2007; Flache & Macy 2011b; Flache & Mäs 2008a).
2.7 In case of an exogenously imposed segregation of agents by a demographic characteristic, a model of nega-
tive influencemakes the counterintuitive prediction that lack of group segregation fosters opinion polarization
between the groups. The reason is that members of segregated groups have less chance to be exposed to dis-
similar others (members of the outgroup), and thus less chances to get negatively influenced and maximize
opinion distance to outgroup members. We thus want to assess in this study whether and to what extent the
negative influence model implies that there is a negative relationship between the level of spatial segregation
by a demographic characteristic and the emergence of opinion polarization.
2.8 Compared to the negative influence model, the model of persuasive arguments (Mäs & Flache 2013) employs
a very dierent mechanism. It combines the homophily principle and the assumption that individuals sharing
opinions also share arguments supporting such opinions (Vinokur & Burnstein 1978). Two interacting partners
with similar opinions keeponproviding eachother newarguments supporting their initial tendencies. Previous
modelingwork showedhow this results in their opinions slowly shiing towards the extremeendof the opinion
scale they initially leaned to. Asdierent network regionsmaydevelopdierent extremeopposite opinions, the
exchange of persuasive arguments can lead to opinion polarization at themacro level without the assumption
of negative influence or even without interaction between members of dierent demographic groups (Mäs &
Flache 2013; Mäs et al. 2013).
2.9 Assuming that agents of the samedemographic group (ingroup) exert a stronger influence than outgroup ones,
we expect that the model of persuasive arguments predicts more opinion polarization for increasing levels of
spatial segregation. This is because, under conditions of spatial segregation based on a demographic charac-
teristic, agents will bemore exposed to their demographic ingroupmembers and less exposed to demographic
outgroup members. To the extent that demographic subgroups have dierent initial opinion tendencies (Mäs
et al. 2013), this increased exposure to demographic in-group members will lead to a reinforcement of initial
opinion tendencies within a demographic subgroup and to increasing dierences between demographic sub-
groups. Our study investigates whether and to what extent there is a positive relationship between the level of
spatial segregation by a demographic characteristic and the emergence of opinion polarization.
2.10 While previous work points to opposite implications for these types of models, it remains unclear how and un-
derwhat conditions segregationhasopposite eects. Inbothmodels polarizationdependsona rangeof further
conditions such as suiciently strong levels of homophily (Mäs et al. 2013), or suicient spatial connectedness
(Flache & Macy 2011b) and the spatial settings employed in previous work were either highly stylized (Flache &
Macy 2011b) or assumed no spatial segregation at all (Mäs et al. 2013).
2.11 To address this gap we develop a formal and computational model1, implemented in NetLogo (Wilensky 1999),
which incorporates the two mechanisms of negative influence and persuasive argument exchange within one
framework. This allows us to compare how dierent levels of segregation aect emergent opinion polariza-
tion under each of the two dierent mechanisms of polarization. Then we compare in more detail the patterns
through which polarization emerges according to both mechanisms: we explore the extent to which they pro-
duce alignment between groupmembership and opinions and how segregation aects polarization both at the
global and at the local level. Thus, we provide a better understanding of the conditions under which according
to twoprominent formal theories of opinion polarization, segregation fosters or represses opinion polarization.
Formal and Computational Model
3.1 Ourmodel defines agents as cells of a toroidal grid (size: 802 = 6400 agents)2. Interactions between agents can
be regarded as exposure events (Pettigrew & Tropp 2006) – these take place in discrete time points and only
between spatial neighbors. Eachagent’s neighborhood (or interactionnetwork) is definedas the set of n closest
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agents (based on a Euclideandistance). The neighborhood sizen is an exogenously givenmodel parameter and
equal for all agents. We start by considering a baseline scenariowithMoore neighborhoods (neighborhood size
= 8).Previous work points out that both the size of the neighborhood (Flache & Macy 2011a) and the presence
of interaction noise (Mäs et al. 2010) may profoundly aect opinion dynamics. Interaction noise implements
a small chance that agents may interact with agents outside their neighborhood or who are too dissimilar to
otherwise allow for interaction under the rules of the model. Thus, we also explore the robustness of model
results to variation in both neighborhood size, and presence of interaction noise.
3.2 Ourmain interest is inopinionpolarizationdynamics that revolvearoundonedominant issueandwheregroups
are defined by one salient demographic feature. To capture this, we assume that agents only have a single
varying and a single static characteristic representing their opinion on an issue and their group membership,
respectively. An agents’ opinion, o, is a continuous variablewith range [−1,+1]. An agent’s groupmembership,
g, is represented by a dichotomous variable {−1,+1}.
3.3 Our model represents the homophily principle in two ways: structurally and behaviorally (McPherson et al.
2001). Structural homophily is imposed through the spatial segregation of the two groups. Due to the seg-
regated environment, individuals’ neighborhoods are structurally more likely to comprise ingroup members.
Stronger segregation implies reduced chances of contact with and exposure to outgroup members and in-
creased chances of contact with and exposure to ingroupmembers.
3.4 Behavioral homophily is modeled as part of the opinion dynamics processes. Drawing from cognitive theories,
we model behavioral homophily such that positive influence is stronger between more similar neighbors than
between dissimilar neighbors (Festinger 1957; McPherson et al. 2001).For the negative influencemodel only, we
also assume that negative influence is stronger for more dissimilar neighbors (Flache & Macy 2011b).
3.5 In other words, homophily aects the degree of influence between two individuals, where stronger influence
implies stronger opinion changes. In this sense, the way we implement homophily is very much similar to the
role that trust has in other modeling work (Grandi et al. 2015): here, influence on individuals’ opinions is as-
sumed to be stronger between individuals who trust each other more. While individuals may not necessarily
always trust thosemore who aremore similar to them, empirical studies point to a tendency of people to eval-
uate similar others more favorably (Byrne 1997) and to be more open to positive influence from similar others
(Burnstein et al. 1961). Finally, it should be noted that an alternative approach to implement behavioral ho-
mophily would be to assume that neighborly interactions are more likely between similar neighbors (Axelrod
1997; Flache & Macy 2011a).
Model initialization: The segregation procedure
3.6 Each simulation run is initialized by segregating agents based on their group membership by means of a res-
idential segregation model. Agents are divided into two equally sized groups. Building on previous research
(Stoica & Flache 2014), we model the environment with an exogenously imposed level of segregation by run-
ning a Schelling-like model of residential segregation. Our segregationmodel builds on and adapts Schelling’s
1971 in that agents decide whether tomove to a dierent location based on a utility function (Zhang 2004) that
allows to gradually dierentiate the strength of a preference for a local ingroup concentration. For a detailed
description of the residential segregation model wemake use of, see Appendix I.
3.7 We initialize our opinion formation model with three predetermined levels of group segregation, denoted low,
medium and high. As exemplified in Figure 1, an increasing level of segregation implies bigger andmore homo-
geneous group agglomerations. As reported in greater detail in Appendix I, the substantive dierence between
these three settings diers quantitatively, too: across all simulation runs, the dissimilarity (or ‘concentration’)
indexD by Massey & Denton (1988) scores 0.29 (std = 0.11) for low-segregated settings; 0.68 (std = 0.11) for
medium segregation, and 0.83 (std = 0.07) for high segregation. Intuitively, this index indicates the fraction of
the population that would need to be relocated to achieve equal group distributions in all neighborhoods in
the world.
Opinion dynamics
3.8 Once the residential segregationmodel terminates, we run themodel of opinion formation. Each agent’s initial
opinion is randomly assigned based on a uniform probability distribution. At each unit of time, one agent i is
selected at random to pick one other agent j randomly selected from her neighborhood for one dyadic interac-
tion (or ‘exposure event’). Interactions result in the initiating agent i updating her opinion. How agents update
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Figure 1: Typical outcomes of our Schelling-like procedure, for the three levels of segregation. Tiles of the same
color represent agents belonging to the same group.
their opinion depends on the specific mechanism under consideration, the negative influence or persuasive
argument exchange.
Negative influence
3.9 Like in the originalmodel of negative influence (Flache &Macy 2011b; Macy et al. 2003), the influence of a neigh-
boring agent j on the opinion of the focal agent i is mediated by a weight,w, measuring the similarity between
the two interacting agents ranging between -1 and +1. Similarity is based on dierence in opinion as well as in
groupmembership. Formally, aer having been selected for an influence event at time point t, agent i updates
her weightw toward her selected neighbor j as follows.
Wij,t = 1− |oj,t − oi,t|H + |gj − gi|
1 +H
(1)
3.10 H is the behavioral homophily parameter – it captures the relative importance of groupmembership and opin-
ion in determining the weight w. We will assume that H > 1. This allows for the possibility that the weight
between agents belonging to the same demographic group and to dierent ethnic groups can both be negative
and positive. Along with the other robustness tests, we will discuss eects of assuming various dierent values
ofH (Appendix III). A higherweightw signifies a stronger similarity between i and j, and vice versa. The highest
similarity (w = 1) occurs when i and j belong to the same group and have an identical opinion. Conversely,
the highest dissimilarity (w = −1) is between two agents belonging to dierent groups and having opposite
extreme opinions.
3.11 In line with previous models, agents update their opinion using w in order to weight the extent of positive or
negative influence to which they are exposed. Neighbors very similar to i (in case of w close to 1), or very dis-
similar (in case ofw close to -1), exert a stronger impact on i’s change of opinion. Theweightw is used tomodel
behavioral homophily (for 0 < w < 1) and xenophobia (−1 < w < 0), as shown in Equation 2. In Equation 2,
∆oi,t represents the rawopinion change resulting froman interaction of iwith j at time tbased on the negative
influence mechanism.
∆oi,t =
1
2
(oj,t − oi,twij,t) (2)
3.12 We call ∆o "raw" opinion change because with−1 ≤ ∆o ≤ 1 it cannot be guaranteed that oi remains within
the interval [−1,+1] aer adding∆o to the prior opinion. Accordingly, oi,t+1 is defined as oit+∆oit unless this
sum exceeds the boundaries of [−1,+1]. Otherwise, oi,t+1 is set to the interval boundary nearest to oit + ∆oit.
Equations 1 and 2 jointly implement the eects of homophily, xenophobia and social influence. For 0 < w < 1,
the raw opinion change ∆o is positive. According to the behavioral homophily principle, greater similarity w
produces stronger positive influence: themore similar i and j, themore i shis her opinion towards j’s opinion
(positive influence). For −1 < w < 0, xenophobia holds: greater dissimilarity between i and j triggers more
negative influence, with imoving her opinion further away from j’s.
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Persuasive argument
3.13 The mechanism of persuasive argument exchange mimics the previous agent-based models grounded in the
so-called Argument-Communication Theory of Bipolarization (Mäs et al. 2013). As we use a much larger pop-
ulation size than previous studies, we developed a slightly simplified but computationally more eicient im-
plementation. In Appendix II we show how our version produces largely the same behavior than the original
model, but we also discuss some small dierences. As in the original model, we assume that agents’ opinion
depends on the arguments they possess in favor or against a certain issue. An agent with mostly positive (neg-
ative) arguments on the issue at stake has a positive (negative) opinion about it. We also assume that agents
have a finite memory capacity, so that they can only know S arguments simultaneously. Because of this, every
time i receives a new argument from j, she drops, or ‘forgets’, an old argument. Furthermore, S ≥ 2: that is,
agents actually have a memory, and a new argument does not entirely determine their new opinion. Because
in our model the opinion range equals 2, we define 2/S as the maximal change a new argument can cause in
i’s opinion. Variable a represents the opinion push of a new argument that i gets from j: a therefore assumes
values +2/S, 0,−2/S, causing a positive, null or negative opinion change. In our baseline scenario an agent’s
memory capacity S contains 7 items. A discussion of the eects of a smaller memory can be found in Appendix
III.
3.14 The argument exchangeduring an interaction takes place as follows. Variable a depends on the outcomeof two
events: agent j picking a pro or con argument, and agent i dropping a pro or con argument. All pro arguments
have the same impact on the opinion and so have all con arguments. The probability that a pro argument gets
picked from an agent’s set of current arguments is
Probability of picking a pro argument =
(oj,t + 1)
2
(3)
Conversely, the probability that an agent picks a negative argument is
Probability of picking a con argument = 1− (oj,t + 1)
2
(4)
3.15 If i drops (forgets) the same kind of argument that j picks (suggests), i’s opinion is unaected by the argument
exchange. We denote this outcome ‘ineective argument exchange’. Conversely, if i drops an argument of a
dierent kind than the one j picks, then i’s opinion changes according to the kind of argument suggested by j.
Equation 5 specifies the rules that determine the value of a:
ai,t =

2
S for j picking a pro and i dropping a con argument,
0 for ineective argument exchange,
− 2S for j picking a con and i dropping a pro argument
(5)
The eect of the persuasive argument on the opinion is defined as follows:
∆oi,t = ai,t
wij,t + 1
2
(6)
3.16 The weightw is the same weight as defined in Equation 1 for the negative influence model. However,w is here
manipulated by adding 1 and dividing by 2. This reflects the fact that, for the model of persuasive arguments,
the weight w should only capture homophily and not xenophobia: greater similarity between i and j implies
stronger eect of the argument a on the rawopinion change∆o, whereas greater dissimilarity implies a smaller
(but not negative) impact of a. Furthermore, this equation allows argument exchanges to take place between
very dierent actors, even those with negative weights w. For S ≥ 2, Equations 5 and 6 bind ∆o to range
between−2/S and 2/S.
3.17 The interaction event is concludedwith calculating the updated opinionOi,t+1 from oi,t + ∆oi,t with the same
rule used for the negative influence model.
Outcomemeasures
3.18 Themost important model outcome is the degree of opinion polarization. Wemeasure opinion polarization in
twoways. First, we compute as an intuitivemeasure the variance of opinions in the whole population. Second,
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we follow the line of previous research using similar models (Flache & Mäs 2008a,b), and operationalize polar-
ization as the variance in the distribution of the pairwise opinion dierences dij across all dyads of agents. For
computational eiciency, we compute the polarization index on a random sample of dyads. Tests showed that
a sample of 64 agents (1% of the population) suices to estimate the polarization index in the population with
suicient accuracy. Formally, the polarization of opinions in the population at time point t is defined as:
Pt =
1
N(N − 1)
∑
ij∈N,i6=j
(dij,t − d¯t)2 (7)
3.19 This index scores between 0 and 1, where Pt = 0 corresponds with full consensus in the population and the
maximum of Pt ≈ 1 is approximated by a population that is divided equally between the extreme opinions of
-1 and +1 (for more details, see Flache & Macy 2011b).
3.20 Along with opinion polarization, we also want to measure the extent to which demographic group member-
ship and opinions overlap – in other words, to which extent opinion dierences between agents are aligned
with dierences in group membership. When group membership and opinion are perfectly aligned, all agents
belonging to the same demographic group hold exactly the same opinion which is maximally dierent from
the opinion of agents of the other demographic group. However, such alignment can arise dierently in dier-
ent spatial regions of the world. That is, in some areas members of group 1 may share a positive opinion and
members of group -1 share a negative opinion, while in other areas of themapmembers of the two groupsmay
share the opposite opinions. Figure 2 visualizes with stylized examples the dierence between a scenario in
which opinion alignment occurs both at the local and global (upper pane) level, and a setting where this align-
ment occurs only at the local level (lower pane). In the latter case, between-group dierences in opinions may
not be large in the population as a whole, but nevertheless there is large polarization between dierent groups
in any particular local region. To disentangle eects of spatial segregation on local and global alignment, we
scrutinize in the following first the presence of alignment at the level of the entire population (hereaer, ‘global
alignment’), and second the presence of alignment within sample neighborhoods (‘local alignment’).
3.21 We capture global alignment by the dierence between opinion variance measured on the entire population,
and opinion variancemeasuredwithin the two groups separately. Themore opinion variance in the population
as a whole exceeds the opinion variance within the two groups, the stronger is global alignment. Conversely, a
lack of global alignment corresponds to no dierences between these variances.
3.22 In order to measure local alignment, we sample 1% of agents (N = 64) at time point 2000 of each simulation
run. We need to look into the opinion distribution within individual neighborhoods. Because neighborhoods
may overlap, and because a demographic group might be underrepresented in some neighborhoods, we can-
not rely on opinion variances as we did for measuring global alignment. Instead, we measure local alignment
by computing the average opinion distance between the sampled agents and their local ingroup neighbors, as
well as their local outgroup neighbors, based on the given neighborhood size. Local alignment is operational-
ized as the dierence between these twomeasures. When groupmembership and opinions are locally aligned,
this shows through smaller dierences in opinion between agents and their ingroup neighbors, and bigger dif-
ferences between them and their outgroup neighbors.
Results
4.1 We ran 14400 independent simulations, 7200 for each of the two opinion formation mechanisms. For each
run we executed 2000 iterations – more than the few hundreds iterations typically needed for the system to
reach a state in which no further systematic change could be discerned within the time frame simulated. For
the negative influence model we conducted 200 runs for each parameter combination, and 100 in the case of
the model of persuasive arguments (as this model has one extra parameter to explore, S). The parameters we
varied are: level of segregation (low, medium, high),H (1, 3), neighborhood size (8, 36), presence of interaction
noise (0%, 1%, 5%) and, for the persuasive argumentmodel solely, the parameterS (3, 7). Ourmain substantive
interest was in the eects of the level of segregation. We first present these eects for a well-defined baseline
‘scenario’, keeping all other parameters fixed. Subsequently, eects of the variation of further parameters will
be discussed. The ‘baseline scenario’ is characterized by the following vector of parameters:
• H = 3: this represents the baseline assumption that, compared to agents’ group membership, their
opinion has a bigger impact on the similarity weightw. It follows from equation 1 that, if two agents have
maximally dierent opinions, themagnitude of their negative weight is twice as big for agents belonging
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Figure 2: Ideal-typical examples of alignment between group membership and opinion. Tiles are the agents;
the presence (or lack of) the orange marker represents the group membership; The two opposite opinions are
visualized in black and white.
to dierent demographic groups (-1) than for agents belonging to the same group (-0.5). Similarly, this
assumption allows both negative and positiveweights regardless of agents’ groupmembership. ForH =
3, an opinion dierence |oj,t − oi,t| ≥ 1.4 between two agents belonging to the same group (thus |gj −
gi| = 0) is enough to yield a negative weight; similarly, an opinion dierence smaller than 0.7 between
outgroup agents produces a positive weight.
• S = 7: this is the maximum memory length inspected in earlier studies of the original model. We take
this value in order to best approximate the continuity of the opinion space.
• neighborhoodsizeequals8: thuswe imposedaMooreneighborhood, reflecting theassumptionof strongly
local interaction.
• no interaction noise.
4.2 For illustration, Figure 3 depicts for both models a typical run under the baseline scenario with medium seg-
regation. As visible here, under the negative influence mechanism polarization emerges from the boundaries
that separate clusters of the two dierent groups. Agents located at these boundaries are highly likely to have
negative interaction weights with their outgroup neighbors, due to the dierence in group membership. As a
consequence, they are likely to be negatively influenced by these neighbors and to shi their opinions towards
the extreme end of the scale opposing their neighbors’ opinions. Then, as time proceeds, positive influence be-
tween ingroupmembers spreads the extremeopinions of agents on the boundaries towards the interior area of
their in group cluster. Eventually, all group boundaries become opinion boundaries, too. The animation shows
that polarization is likely to occur at boundaries between groups, but it also illustrates that opinion splits can
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(a) Negative influence. (b) Persuasive arguments.
Figure 3: Typical simulation run for the two processes in the baseline scenario at time = 500, medium segre-
gation. Tiles are the agents; the presence (or lack of) the orange marker represents the group membership;
opinions are visualized with a white-to-black gradient. A complete animation is available in the online version.
developwithina spatial cluster. This is possiblebecausedierent local alignments canoccur atdierentbound-
aries of a cluster. From these dierent boundaries, opposite extreme opinions will then further spread within
a cluster until their incumbents become direct neighbors who are too dierent to further influence each other
or are separated by a small zone of fellow group members adopting intermediating positions on the opinion
scale.
4.3 The spatial arrangement of opinion clusters generated by the persuasive argument mechanism looks rather
dierent: here, polarization cascades are not triggered by agents lying on group clusters’ boundaries. In addi-
tion, emerging opinion clusters appear to be overall less polarized, and their boundaries are less sharp. Thus,
groupclusters andopinion clusters show little overlap. This result seems to contradict earlierworkbasedon the
model of persuasive arguments that revealed how sharp opinion polarization can quickly arise between demo-
graphically dierent subgroups (Mäs et al. 2013). We expect that this dierence is largely due to the fact the we
employ amuch larger population size thanprevious studies. This greatly increases the coordination complexity
of the sequence of events that is required to produce alignment of the arguments within and between groups.
Mäs et al. (2013) showed how already with a population of N = 20 several thousands of interaction events
were required to generate high levels of polarization between groups in their model. We further explored this
explanation and the robustness of our results in additional experiments (see also appendices II and III).
4.4 To systematically assess eects of segregation in the baseline scenario, we proceeded by first investigating the
eects of dierent levels of segregation on the emergence of opinion polarization according to the twomodels.
Then, we focused on the patterns through which polarization is generated, and distinguished global from local
alignment between opinions and groupmembership. Because in the baseline scenario the outcomemeasures
are quasi-normally distributed, we analyze the simulations’ output through analyses of variance.
Segregation and opinion polarization
4.5 Wewanted to testwhether thenegative influencemodelpredicts that segregation reducespolarization,whereas
the persuasive argument model implies the opposite relationship.
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Figure 4: Typical simulation outcomes at time= 2000, for dierent levels of segregation (baseline scenario).
Tiles are the agents; the presence (or lack of) the orange marker represents the group membership; opinions
are visualized with a white-to-black gradient.
4.6 Figure 4 shows, for two typical simulation runs, the eects of dierent levels of segregation on the models’
outcome. High segregation implies smaller chances of contact between and exposure to outgroup members.
For the negative influence model, this translates to agents’ decreased chances of being exposed to negative
influence, and thus leads to less polarization. In fact, at time = 2000 we observe strong polarization on the
borders of group clusters, where intergroup contacts take place; both in the low and in the high segregation
condition. However, this translates into less overall polarization in thehigh segregation condition, becausehere
the inner areas of group clusters are larger, where intergroup contacts are inhibited and agents are therefore
more likely to share a moderate opinion. For the model of persuasive arguments, more segregation translates
to more chances for agents to end up in a mutual reinforcement loop with similar agents (who exert stronger
influence). Thus, this should lead tomorepolarization. However, Figure 4 showsno visually discernible eect of
segregation on the emergence of opinion polarization under the assumption of persuasive argument exchange.
Next, we computed quantitative measures of polarization for the dierent levels of segregation, in order to
obtain a more precise assessment of the eects of segregation.
4.7 Figure 5 charts the eects of segregation on the measures of opinion polarization in the population, averaged
across all simulation runs conducted for the baseline scenario. We see that the negative influencemodel gener-
ates a clear negative relationship between segregation andpolarization, whereas the association is veryweakly
positive for the model of persuasive arguments. This supports the intuitions that earlier work suggests for the
more complex and realistic setting investigated here. According to a negative influence process, increasing spa-
tial segregation results in less opinion polarization. The model of persuasive arguments hints at the opposite
prediction. Here, spatial segregation shows a very weak positive eect on polarization.
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Figure 5: Measures of polarization for dierent levels of segregation (baseline scenario).
4.8 An ANOVA on the measures of polarization for all simulation runs (baseline scenario, t = 2000) for the three
dierent levels of segregation further supports this interpretation. The results for the model of negative influ-
ence show that higher levels of segregation result in significantly lower values of the polarization index (η2 =
0.871,p < .001) and opinion variance in the whole population (η2 = 0.862,p < .001). For the model of persua-
sive arguments, results dier. The results suggest that higher segregation can foster polarization: whereas seg-
regation showsno significantly positive eect on thepolarization index, it produces significantly higher opinion
variance (η2 = 0.133,p < .001). Results for themodel of persuasive arguments show amuchweaker eect: the
increase of the polarization index between low and high levels of segregation is on average only 0.004, com-
pared to 0.478 for the other model. This confirms our earlier result that with our larger population and more
realistic segregation patterns, themodel of persuasive arguments generates considerably lower levels of polar-
ization than in previous studies even when high spatial segregation is imposed.
Alignment of groupmembership and opinion
4.9 Next, we explored the dierence between global and local alignment of group dierences and opinion under
both models. Figure 6 shows a clear dierence in the degree of global alignment between the two models.
In the baseline scenario only the negative influence mechanism generates global alignment, whereas there is
virtually no global alignment under the model of persuasive arguments. Simulations also show that according
to the negative influence model, stronger spatial segregation results in increasing global alignment âĂŞ the
dierence between population opinion variance and the within-groups opinion variance becomes larger (η2 =
0.237,p < .001). For the model of persuasive arguments there is no discernible relation to segregation.
4.10 To distinguish local alignment from global alignment, we comparedmean opinion dierences between agents
and their in- and outgroup neighbors. Figure 7 shows, for the baseline scenario, that the two models dier in
terms of alignment at the local level, too. Negative influence generatesmore local alignment than themodel of
persuasive arguments. Moreover, the model implies increasing alignment for increasing levels of segregation
at the local level, too. At the same time, the results highlight an important dierence: while increasing segre-
gation reduces the global variance of opinions both in the population as a whole and within the two groups,
we find that at the local level higher segregation elicits a larger dierence of opinions between groups and a
smaller dierence within groups. In other words, according to the negative influence model, higher segrega-
tion increases polarization between groups at the local level, but reduces polarization at the global level. For
the model of persuasive arguments, levels of local alignment are again low and are hardly related to segrega-
tion. The dierence between themodels is further confirmed by an analysis of variance of themeasure of local
alignment (η2 = 0.767,p < .001).
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Figure 6: Global alignment between group membership and opinion (baseline scenario). Global alignment is
measured as the dierence between population opinion variance and within-groups opinion variance.
Figure 7: Local alignment betweengroupmembership andopinion (baseline scenario). Local alignment ismea-
sured as the dierence in opinion between the sample agents’ ingroup and outgroup neighbors.
Robustness
4.11 We carried out a number of robustness tests to assess eects of the other model parameters on the relation
between segregationandpolarization. Theparametersweconsideredare: theneighborhood size, thepresence
of interaction noise, the homophily parameter H, and the length of agents’memory,S. Herewe report themain
findings – a detailed discussion of the tests can be found in Appendix III.
4.12 The relationship between spatial segregation and opinion polarization shows to be robust against the assump-
tion of dierent neighborhood sizes anda lower value ofH andS. This relationship remains negative according
to the negative influence model, and mildly positive under the model of persuasive arguments. However, only
themodel of persuasive arguments is robust against the introductionof interactionnoise, whereas thenegative
influence model is not.
4.13 For the negative influence model, the assumption that 1% of interactions occur between random dyads of
agents is enough to exhibit strong polarization (both between andwithin groups and both globally and locally)
regardless of the level of segregation, such that the negative relationship between segregation and polariza-
tion is canceled out. This can be explained firstly by the fact that random interactions bypass the interaction
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structure as imposed by the segregation pattern. Secondly, our assumption of interactions as dyadic is crucial.
Previous modelling work has shown how multilateral local interactions can have a stabilizing eect when in-
teraction noise exposes agents to occasional influence from ‘outside deviants’ (Flache &Macy 2011a). It follows
that, assuming dyadic interactions, we make it more likely that an agent’s random exposure to the negative
influence of an outgroupmember triggers a polarizing cascade.
Conclusions
5.1 We developed a formal and computational model aligning two ABMs of opinion formation: a model of simul-
taneous positive and negative influence, and amodel of persuasive argument exchange. Our study shows that
these two models make conflicting predictions about the relationship between spatial group segregation and
the emergence of opinion polarization in a population. Future work can build on these insights and test the
conflicting model implications against empirical data on, for example, residential ethnic segregation and the
spatial distribution of extremeopinions about issues that are salient to interethnic relations in a diverse society.
5.2 The key hypotheses we deduced from themodel of negative influence are that stronger group segregation gen-
erates less opinion polarization in thewhole population. However, this goes hand in handwith a stronger align-
ment of opinions and demographic group membership, both globally and locally. With more spatial segrega-
tion, the opinions of demographic groups dier more. These predictions are vulnerable to interaction noise:
only 1% random interaction suiced to generate strong polarization and global alignment regardless of the
level of segregation. While this points to the possibility that the eects we found for negative influence may
be of limited generalizability, it should be kept inmind that with the assumption of dyadic interactionwe chose
for a model specification that is highly sensitive to noise. Model specifications conventionally used in the lit-
erature (e.g., Flache & Macy 2011b) typically use multi-lateral influence. Future work should test whether – as
previous studies suggest – a combination of the assumptions ofmultilateral interactionwith the negative influ-
ence model entails more robust eects of spatial segregation.
5.3 For the model of persuasive arguments we found a very weakly positive eect of spatial segregation on the
emergence of opinion polarization and the alignment of opinion dierences with group dierences. This weak
relationship turned out to be stable and statistically significant against all of the parameter combinations we
used in our robustness tests. Whereas previous work showed that the persuasive arguments mechanism gen-
erates high levels of polarization, our results do not reflect this. A possible explanation is that we used a much
larger population than previous studies, which makes the coordination needed to generate a sequence of ar-
gument exchanges that produces large intergroup dierences and high levels of polarization less likely. Amore
detailed analysis of this explanation is provided in Appendix II.
5.4 Our analyses not only tested intuitions suggested by previous work on how spatial group segregation relates
to opinion polarization, but we also discovered an intriguing new eect of spatial segregation. While previous
modellingworkusing small populationsonly focusedon thedegreeof polarization and its alignmentwith inter-
group dierences in the population as a whole, we employed a population large enough to reveal that eects
of segregation on polarization may be dierent at the global and the local level. We distinguished between
global and local alignment, where global alignment refers to the association between group membership and
opinion in the population as a whole, whereas local alignment refers to the same relationship inside individual
neighborhoods. Both at the global and local level, negative influence is shown to generate alignment. We also
demonstrated that under negative influence, more segregation actually reduces polarization in the whole pop-
ulation and within each demographic group at the global level. At the same time, higher segregation increases
alignment of opinions with demographic group membership at the global and local level. In contrast, for the
model of persuasive arguments we found support for a mildly positive eect of segregation on the emergence
of alignment only at the local scale.
5.5 We started our paper with the questions how and through which processes ethnic residential segregation may
relate to potential intergroup polarization in diverse societies. Our abstractmodels do of course not capture all
complexities involved in interethnic relations, butwe focused on a scenario representing the situation of a soci-
ety inwhich opinions divide around one salient issue related to intergroup dierences (e.g. immigration policy)
and one salient intergroup distinction (e.g. immigrant vs. native). For this scenario, our study highlighted dif-
ferent potential societal conflicts that could result from people adjusting their opinions according to the two
processes we studied. When individuals form their opinion by exchanging arguments, ethnic segregation may
result in more individuals adopting either markedly moderate or markedly extreme positions on the issue at
stake. By contrast, the negative influence process points to other potential threats of segregation for intergroup
relations.
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5.6 The spatial segregation of two ethnic groups, according to this model, has two eects: first, it decreases polar-
ization on the issue at stake, and second, it makes group dierences more pronounced: individuals belonging
to the same ethnic group are expected to develop a common attitude on the issue, opposite to the attitude
held by the other group. In sum, the negative influence model points at a trade-o between striving for more
moderate opinion dierences between two ethnic groups (by enforcing their residential integration), or striving
for less opinion polarization in the population as awhole (by allowing ethnic residential segregation).For policy
makers, this might represent a dilemma.
5.7 This study represents a theoretical step toward the systematization and comparison of the predictions that two
prominent opinion formation models make for the eects of spatial segregation on opinion polarization in a
society. We believe that the potential threats of segregation for intergroup relations identified by our study
warrant both more theoretical analysis and careful empirical research testing implications of these two pro-
cesses on data about interethnic spatial segregation and opinion divisions between ethnic groups in diverse
societies.
Appendix I: The segregation procedure
In line with previous research (Stoica & Flache 2014), we modeled the environment with an exogenously im-
posed level of segregation by running a Schelling-like model of residential segregation in NetLogo. The model
takes as input several parameters: first, a radius r, conditioning the size of agents’ neighborhood. In eect, an
agent’s neighborhood of size n is defined as the set of agents lying within a radius r. Second, a satisfaction
threshold T , consisting in themaximum tolerated share of outgroupmembers in an agent’s neighborhood. We
ran the segregation model imposing a mild satisfaction threshold T = 0.5. This model of residential segrega-
tion diers from the originalmodel (Schelling 1971) in the fact that agents decidewhether tomove to a dierent
location based on a utility function (Zhang 2004):
U(x) =
{
x
pn , x ≤ pn
m+ (n−x)(1−m)n(1−p) , x > pn
(8)
In equation 8,m is a constant factor representing the desirability of a neighborhood of only ingroupmembers,
and p represents the optimal fraction of ingroupmembers in the neighborhood of size n. It follows that agents
enjoy the highest utility when the proportion of ingroup members equals p. Proportions greater than p may
result in a lower utility, ifm < p.
The segregation procedure starts with the torus’ cells being randomly assigned to one of the two groups, ex-
cept for 15% of them which remain unassigned and serve as empty space for future moving of agents (‘called
buer’). At each iteration, the soware identifies a set of agents whose neighborhood composition is unsatis-
factory (U < T ). Each unsatisfied agent first scans the buer in search for locations where the expected utility
would be greater than T , thus satisfactory. If such a location exists, the agent moves to one of the satisfactory
locations. If no satisfactory locations are available, the agent scans again the buer in search for a location
where the expected utility is greater than the utility she enjoys at her current location, even if the expected util-
ity falls below the satisfaction threshold T . If a better location is found, the agent moves to the better location,
otherwise does not move.
The segregation procedure terminates when at least one of the three following conditions is met: (1) the segre-
gation procedure has gone through 50 iterations; (2) the segregation procedure has gone through 3 iterations
without agents moving; (3) there are no unsatisfied agents le to move.
At the end of the procedure, buer cells are assigned to group 1 with a probability equal to the proportion of
neighboring cells already assigned to group 1 out of the whole neighborhood. With the complementary proba-
bility, cells are assigned to group -1.
This segregation model allowed us to model twomain dimensions of the concept of segregation. Such dimen-
sions are:
• Cluster homogeneity. Variations in the given value of parameter p result, at the end of the segregation
procedure, in dierent levels of homogeneity within the group clusters. Higher values of p producemore
homogeneous clusters. Our predetermined segregation levels are generated with three values of p, for
p ∈ 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 for low, medium and high segregation respectively (see Figure 1).
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• Cluster size. Variations in the given value of r result in agents clustering in agglomerations of dierent
sizes. Bigger radii r generate bigger clusters. In our settings we vary cluster sizes, for r ∈ 1, 3, 5, for low,
medium and high segregation respectively.
The three stylized settings we used can be shown to dier quantitatively in the group composition of agents’
neighborhoods. We show this through an intuitive and establishedmeasure of spatial segregation, the dissim-
ilarity (or ‘concentration’) index D proposed by Massey & Denton (1988). For this, we divide the world into L
equally large local units l. The size of such local units is meant to mirror the range at which local interactions
take place: therefore, we define the size of the local units based on the neighborhood size. In our baseline
scenario the neighborhood size is 8 (Moore neighborhoods), and local units l are sized 3x3.
D =
1
2
∑
l∈L
|Nla
Na
− Nlb
b
| (9)
Nla andNlb are the number of agents in local unit l for group a and b respectively;Na andNb are the total sizes
of both groups across all local units. The theoretical range ofD is 0, 1. Themore dissimilar local neighborhood
compositions are on average to the population composition, the higher isD. The dissimilarity indexD takes
on average values of 0.29 (std= 0.11) for low-segregated settings; 0.68 (std= 0.11) formedium segregation, and
0.83 (std = 0.07) for high segregation.
Appendix II: Comparison with the original persuasive argumentmodel
In this appendixwe list the dierences between our implementation of themodel of persuasive argument sand
the originalmodel, discuss their compatibility, and further elaborate and test a tentative explanation of why, in
our baseline scenario, the persuasive argument exchange generates less opinion polarization than expected.
The implementation of the persuasive argument exchange outlined in this paper is a simplified version of the
model as first formalized (hereaer, ‘original model’) (Mäs & Flache 2013; Mäs et al. 2013).The reason why we
implemented the process dierently is of a very practical nature. While craing a common formal framework
for the models of negative influence and persuasive argument exchange, we were constrained by the need for
a computationally eicient design and for a clear and simple formalization. Thus, we pursued parsimony in the
number of themodel’s parameters and simplicity in its definition. Thedierences betweenour implementation
and the original model follow from the trade-o between computational eiciency (and simplicity) and fidelity
to the original model.
The first dierence concerns the implementation of the homophily principle, the individuals’ tendency to in-
teract more, or more oen, with similar alters. In the original model, homophily is implemented through ho-
mophilous selection: the probability of interaction between two agents is function of their relative similarity in
their opinion or demographic attributes. The more similar a neighbor is to the focal agent compared to other
neighbors, themore likely it is that theyengage inan interactionandexchangearguments. Inour currentmodel,
interactions takeplacewith auniformprobability betweenneighboring agents. Thehomophily principle is cap-
tured by the weight w, instead. This weight is a measure of the similarity between dyads of agents and rules
the eectiveness (or salience) of the interaction on an agent’s shi in opinion (Equation 6). The more similar
two agents are, the stronger the eect of the exchanged argument on their opinion. Thus, unlike in the original
model, in our implementation new arguments do not always have the same eect on agents’ opinion.
A second dierence can be found in the definition of agents’ memory S. In the original model, the authors
modeled the agents’memoryS as a vector (ordered list). Here, wemodeledS as a set (unordered list). The two
solutions dier in the way an agent drops an argument during an interaction. According to the original model,
the agent drops the oldest argument of the list; in ourmodel, an agent drops a randomly chosen argument from
the set.
Additionally, in the original model arguments are countable items from a set of pro (or con) arguments: this
means that, aer repeated interactions, some of those arguments can be wiped out of every agent’s memory
vector, and thereaer have no chance of being exchanged again. In our model arguments are simply fractions
of an agent’s opinion, and have a probability of being positive or negative depending on the sign of the opinion.
This dierence has two implications. The first implication is that our implementation does not produce the
depletion of arguments being exchanged that is produced by the original model.
The second implication is that the systemcould require a reducednumberof interactions for it to converge. This
is the case for a situationwhere all agents hold the same extreme opinion (-1 or +1): in our implementation, this
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can only happen when the system has converged and no more interactions are possible. However, in the orig-
inal model (with arguments modelled explicitly), this could happen when all agents have the same arguments
vector, or if agents have dierent argument vectors, but the same proportion of pro arguments in that vector.
In this latter case, the system has not yet converged because agents can still receive new arguments while in-
teracting. Because opinion consensus on an extreme opinion is a convergence state in our implementation but
not necessarily in the original model, it is possible that the outcome of convergence on extreme consensus is
more likely for our implementation of the persuasive arguments model, than for the original model.
The last, andarguablymost important dierence is thepopulation size. Theoriginalmodel assumesa complete
network of 20 nodes, whereas in our simulations the interaction network has 802 = 6400 nodes – as result of
the need to model dierent, non-overlapping neighborhoods, with distinct spatial segregation patterns.
To assess whether our implementation behaves consistently with the original model, we aligned it with the
conditions simulated inprevious studiesand replicated their key simulationexperiments (hereaer, ‘replication
study’). This is not an analytical test of model equivalence, nor a proof that the two versions generate similar
outcomes when assuming large populations. However, it shows that the two model versions generate very
similar model behavior under comparable conditions âĂŞ in this case, the conditions assumed in the original
model.
To imitate the population size and interaction structure of the original model (Mäs et al. 2013) in the replication
study (a complete network of 20 nodes), we assumed a two-dimensional world sized 4x5, and a neighborhood
size equal to 19. Because every agent’s neighborhood comprises the entire population, and because neighbors
are chosenwith a uniformprobability for interaction, the initial level of spatial group segregation has no eects
on the interaction structure. Similarly, interaction noise can’t play any role in altering the interaction structure,
so we ruled it out. Furthermore, the original model assumed three demographic attributes and one opinion
dimension: to approximate this proportion, we assumed H = 0.33. We varied S for S = 2, 4, 7, respecting
the variation range of the memory length in the original model. We ran 3000 simulations, and each run only
terminates once the system has reached equilibrium (perfect polarization or perfect consensus).
Compatibly with the original model, all of the simulation runs developed perfect consensus on extreme opin-
ions (with every agent sharing an opinion 1 or -1). For S = 4, convergence needed on average 129527 iterations
(std = 125897) each of which comprises 20 interaction events. Moreover, similarly to what the original model
generated, we found that S, under this specific set of conditions, has no qualitative eect on the conditions
that aect the degree of polarization. Ourmodel succeeded at replicating the original model’s dynamics âĂŞ in
particular, under the same conditions, it generated perfect extreme opinion consensus in every simulation run.
The fact that perfect consensus on extreme opinions was always reached in the replication study clashes with
the fact that it was never reached in the baseline scenario studied in this paper. The reason why our model did
not generate perfect polarization or perfect consensus in the baseline scenario lies in the dierent conditions
between the baseline scenario and the conditions imposed for the replication study. Two conditions discrimi-
nate between the two cases: the number of iterations allowed in the model, and the population size.
Number of iterations and population size
Whereasunder conditionsof the replication studyourmodel takesonaverage 129527 iterations for convergence
to equilibrium, the baseline scenario is run only up to 2000 iterations. Whereas we cannot exclude that our
model may converge to an equilibrium state (perfect polarization or perfect consensus) aer a much larger
number of iterations, these results suggest that the time needed for such convergence would be prohibitively
long and also far too long for reflecting empirically plausible time scales. To recall, we assumed in the baseline
scenario a population size ofN = 6400 agents, 320 times as large theN = 20 used in the replication study.
In all likelihood, time to convergence increases far more than linearly in the number of agents in a population.
Hence, the average time to convergence can be expected to be far more than about 41 million iterations (320
times 129527, theaveragenumberof iterations for convergenceunderN = 20).While the results for thebaseline
scenario may not necessarily reflect equilibrium behavior, we find that they reflect a metastable state of the
model that can be expected to endure for a large period of time before eventually an equilibrium may arise.
We observe that the polarization tendency stabilizes during the first few hundreds iterations, and exhibits no
discernible trend thereaer.
Weacknowledge that theeectsof thenetworksizeandstructureon themodelofpersuasivearguments remain
largely unexplored, and deserve further research.
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Appendix III: Robustness tests
Here we discuss in detail the eects of model’s parameters on the relation between segregation and polariza-
tion.
Neighborhood size
To assess eects of neighborhood size, we ran half of the simulations imposing a Moore neighborhood (neigh-
borhood size= 8), and the other half imposing a bigger neighborhood (sized 36). Previouswork suggests dier-
ent eects of this parameter for the twoprocessesof opinion formation. Undernegative influence, bigger neigh-
borhoods signify bigger chances for an agent to end up interacting with a dissimilar interaction partner, which
increases chances of polarization. Despite of this, simulation results for the negative influence model show
no significant eect of the neighborhood size on the polarization index and opinion variance. However, there
is a significant eect on the measures of alignment: the relationship between neighborhood size and global
alignment is positive (η2 = 0.055,p < .001), and negative in the case of local alignment (η2 = 0.206,p < .001).
For themodel of persuasive arguments we expected that bigger neighborhoods reduce polarization. Increased
chances to meet interaction partners with dierent opinion should result in agents receiving more moderat-
ing arguments. This is confirmed by our simulations: ceteris paribus, for the model of persuasive arguments
bigger neighborhoods result in reduced polarization (η2 = 0.444,p < .001) and lower opinion variance (η2 =
0.931,p < .001). Moreover, higher neighborhood size reduces local alignment of groupmembership and opin-
ion (η2 = 0.085,p < .001).
Most importantly, the relationship between initial level of segregation and opinion polarization that we identi-
fied for the baseline scenario is robust against increasing neighborhood size. For the negative influencemodel,
the assumption of a bigger neighborhood does not alter the negative relationship of segregation on the polar-
ization index (η2 = 0.495,p < .001) and opinion variance (η2 = 0.452,p < .001). Similarly, for the model of
persuasive arguments, segregation still has a non-significantly positive eect on the polarization index and a
positive eect on the opinion variance (η2 = 0.447,p < .001).
Interaction noise
We introduced interaction noise by assuming that at each point in time a fraction of 1% (N = 64) or 5% (N =
320) of the agents is selected to interact with a random agent. Dyads were randomly selected from the set of
nonneighboring dyads with a uniform probability.
The eects of interaction noise on the two processes are expected to be similar to the eects of increasing the
neighborhood size. In the case of the negative influencemechanism, the presence of interactions with random
partners makes it more likely to trigger themutual repulsion whichmakes themmove to amore extreme opin-
ion. Conversely, in the case of persuasive argument exchange, random interactions increase the chances that
agents receive moderating arguments, thus reducing polarization in the population. Coherently, simulations
(forH = 3, S = 7, and neighborhood size = 8) show that the introduction of random interactions results, at
t = 2000, in higher scores of the polarization index for the model of negative influence (η2 = 0.197,p < .001),
and smaller scores for the model of persuasive arguments (η2 = 0.100,p < .001).
The mildly positive relationship between segregation and opinion variance generated by the model of persua-
sive arguments is robust against the introductionof interactionnoise (1%noise: η2 = 0.318,p < .001; 5%noise:
η2 = 0.558,p < .001). One of the features of the implementation of thismodel (discussed in Appendix II) could,
at least partly, explain its robustness to interaction noise. Specifically, in this implementation, wemimic the ar-
gument exchangedynamics as if newarguments took theplace of one randomly chosen argument from the set.
However, in the original model, when the agent receives a new argument she drops the oldest argument of the
memory vector, and not a randomly chosen one. This means that, in our implementation, at any point in time
a new argument has equal chances to be forgotten as any other argument. In the original model, a new argu-
ment has less chances to be forgotten soon. As a result, arguments that are adopted during an interaction with
a random alter are more likely to be forgotten soon (and thus to have a smaller eect) in our implementation
of the model, than in the original model.
The negative influence model, however, appears to be less robust to interaction noise. Regardless of the level
of segregation, random interactions under the assumptions of negative influence produce very high scores on
the polarization index, such that the negative relationship between segregation and polarization is canceled
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out. Our explanation is that under our implementation of negative influence, a small number of interaction
events that trigger negative influence can suice to set o a self-reinforcing cascade of increasing polarization.
Spatial segregation confines this process to boundaries between spatial clusters and shelters agents in the inte-
rior of clusters from interactions with outgroup members that are likely to trigger negative influence. Random
interaction breaks the eect of spatial boundaries and thus triggers the emergence of polarization also in less
segregated scenarios. Furthermore, simulation results show that interaction noise also has a positive eect on
the emergence of global alignment (η2 = 0.064,p < .001). In sum, agents’ exposure to random interactions
increases the likelihood that the two groups develop internal consensus on two opposite extreme opinions,
as indicated by the emerging strong polarization and strong global alignment. We expect that there is a crit-
ical lower boundary for the degree of interaction noise below the levels that we inspected, such that below
this boundary spatial segregation can still temper the emergence of polarization and alignment also under the
negative influence model.
We also think that our implementation of negative influence may be more sensitive to these eects of interac-
tion noise than the models used in previous work (Flache & Macy 2011b). An important dierence is that our
model assumes a dyadic interaction mechanism, in which an agent’s opinion is influenced by one interaction
partner at a time. We adopted this assumption for consistency with the framework used in the literature on
the model of persuasive arguments (Mäs et al. 2013). However, previous models of negative influence typically
assume that opinion shis result from the weighted average of the simultaneous influences of all neighbors.
This makes it more likely that in our implementation a single interaction event with an outgroup member can
elicit extreme opinion shis. The reason is that in this situation agents’ opinions are not tempered by the si-
multaneous influence of their ingroup neighbors in the interior of a cluster, which in a segregated setting are
on average more frequent and are more likely to hold moderate opinions. Previous work based on Axelrod’s
model of cultural dissemination demonstrated a similar stabilizing eect ofmultilateral as opposed to bilateral
interactions against the influence of interaction noise (Flache & Macy 2011a).
Homophily parameter H
In the original model of negative influence with group dierences (Flache & Mäs 2008a), the authors assumed
that all attributes (opinion dimensions and demographic attributes) have the same weight, but the number
of opinion dimensions is bigger than the number of demographic attributes. As a result, opinion dierences
mattermore than groupdierences. To reflect this, for the baseline scenariowe imposedH = 3, assuming that
agents’ opinion dierences matter more than their group dierences in defining the weight w of an interaction
(Equation 1). In this way we allowed positive weights between out-group agents, as well as negative weights
between ingroup agents. In case there is only one relevant opinion dimension, and one relevant demographic
attribute, the original model works the same as our implementation withH = 1. For this reason, we test the
implications of assuming H = 3 instead of H = 1. Because for H = 1 agent’s group membership plays
a bigger role, we expect that under both models, H = 1 implies stronger ingroup agreement and outgroup
disagreement (that is, stronger alignment).
In line with our expectations we find that, in a ceteris-paribus replication of the baseline scenario, at t = 2000,
H has a significant negative eect onmeasures of alignment both for negative influence (local alignment: η2 =
0.287, p < .001; global: η2 = 0.023, p < .001) and the model of persuasive arguments (local alignment:
η2 = 0.019, p = .001). Most importantly, we observe no significant eect of this parameter on the relationship
between segregation and polarization under both models: for H = 1, under the negative influence model
segregation has a negative eect on the polarization index (η2 = 0.866, p < .001) and opinion variance (η2 =
0.867, p < .001); under themodel of persuasive arguments, we observe amildly positive relationship between
segregation and polarization index (η2 = 0.033, p < .01) and opinion variance (η2 = 0.310, p < .001).
Agent’s memory S
Lastly, we consider the length of agents’ memoryS used for themodel of persuasive arguments. In our simula-
tions wemodeled two kinds of memory, a shorter (S = 3) and a longer one (S = 7). A shorter memory implies
that a new argument has a bigger impact on opinion change. This suggests that shorter memories foster polar-
ization, as also shown by Mäs et al. (2013) (Online Appendix). In line with their findings, our simulations reveal
that at time 2000, simulations conducted with the higher value of S generate lower polarization (η2 = 736,
p < .001) as well as lower opinion variance (η2 = 989, p < .001). However, these eects of S do not change
the qualitative relationship between segregation and polarization that we identified for the baseline scenario
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under the model of persuasive arguments: in fact, assuming S = 3, the relationship between segregation and
polarization remains mildly positive (polarization index: η2 = 0.044, p = .001; opinion variance: η2 = 0.314,
p < .001).
Notes
1Themodel code can be found at https://www.openabm.org/model/4979/version/1/view.
2This population size is much larger than in previous formal modelling work, allowing for variation in spa-
tial segregation patterns. The dierence in population size has important consequences for model behavior of
persuasive argument exchange, as discussed in Appendix II.
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